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FoCaLiZe is an object-oriented programming environment
that combines specifications, programs and proofs in the
same language. This paper describes how its features can
be used to formally express specifications and to develop by
stepwise refinement the design and implementation of se-
cured systems, while proving that the implementation meets
its specification or design requirements. We thus obtain a
modular implementation of a generic framework for the def-
inition of security policies together with certified enforce-
ment mechanism for these policies.
Categories and Subject Descriptors D.3.3 [Programming
Languages]: Language Constructs and Features—Frameworks,
Inheritance; D.2.4 [Software/Program Verification]: Cor-
rectness proofs, Formal methods; D.2.6 [Programming En-
vironments]
General Terms Security, Languages, Verification
Keywords FoCaLiZe, security policies, enforcement mech-
anisms
1. Introduction
There is now a large collection of literature on security poli-
cies and secured systems: many policies and operational
mechanisms have been proposed to ensure security in a sys-
tem, each of them describing in a more or less formal way,
within a particular specification language, a notion of infor-
mation system suitable in a particular context together with
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some security requirements. Because of the variety of for-
malisms, it is rather difficult to reuse, refine, compare and
compose these developments, for example when defining a
variant of an existing development. To ease these tasks, it
seems desirable to express such developments in a common
framework and within a language that enables the develop-
ment of modular programs and provides refinement mecha-
nisms that allow working at different levels of abstraction in
the same framework. Furthermore, the separation between
the security policies and the operational mechanisms that
are used to enforce them is now considered a main secu-
rity design requirement: policies have to be specified inde-
pendently of such mechanisms. In [19], a formal framework
was introduced to deal with some of these issues; it is briefly
described in section 3. The aim of the work presented in this
paper is to implement a large part of this framework within a
programming environment in order to obtain a development
that allows defining security policies together with the oper-
ational mechanism that enforce them over transition systems
and a formal certification of these mechanisms.
Nowadays, critical systems are evaluated according to
some standards like the Common Criteria [12] or according
to standards dedicated to particular domains (like the FIPS-
140-3 specifying security requirements for cryptographic
modules [16]). These standards often require the use of for-
mal methods in order to ensure some safety and security
properties needed of the systems in question. However, de-
veloping and evaluating such critical systems is a difficult
task that requires advanced technical knowledge and large
amounts of time. To make the task easier, we use the FoCaL-
iZe [17] integrated developement environment (IDE), which
was conceived from the beginning to help build systems with
high safety and security assurances, and which eases (and
partially automates) the application of formal methods dur-
ing the development cycle.
FoCaLiZe [17] provides an object-oriented functional
language that allows writing specifications, programs, and
the formal proofs that the programs meet their specifications.
The object-oriented features of this language enable the de-
velopment of an implementation by iterative refinement of
its specification. Moreover, FoCaLiZe provides several au-
tomatic tools to ease the generation of programs from spec-
ifications [15], the generation of proofs [5], the generation
of documentation, and the production of test suites [9, 10].
Using these tools together with an adequate methodology
of development (as the one introduced in [3]) also makes
the developments easier to formally evaluate according to
the aforementioned standards. In the domains of safety and
security, two main developments have been already done
within FoCaLiZe: a full formalization of airport security reg-
ulations [14], and the implementation of a generic voter [2],
which is a central equipment of all fault tolerant architec-
tures, widely used for safety related systems.
2. FoCaLiZe
FoCaLiZe [17] is a programming environment that includes
a language based on firm theoretical results [23], with a
clear semantics and provides an efficient implementation –
via translation to OCaml [22]. It has functional and object-
oriented features and provides means for the programmers
to write formal proofs of their code in a more or less de-
tailed way within a declarative proof language based on the
Zenon automatic theorem prover [5]. Zenon eases the task of
writing formal proofs and translates them into Coq [13] for
high-assurance checking. FoCaLiZe also provides power-
ful features (such as inheritance, parameterization and late-
binding) that enable a stepwise refinement methodology to
go from specification all the way down to executable code.
Thus, FoCaLiZe unifies within the same language the for-
mal modeling work, the development of the code, and the
certification proofs.
2.1 Species
In FoCaLiZe, the primitive entity of a development is the
species. Species are the nodes of the hierarchy of structures
that makes up a development. A species can be seen as a set
of methods grouping “things” related to the same concept.
As in most modular design systems (i.e. object-oriented,
abstract data types, etc.) the idea is to group a data struc-
ture with the operations on the data structure, the specifi-
cation of these operations (in the form of properties), the
representation requirements, and the proofs of the proper-
ties. Each method is identified by its name and can be either
declared (primitive constants, operations and properties) or
defined (implementation of operations, definition of proper-
ties and proofs of theorem). Moreover, we can distinguish
three kinds of “methods”: the carrier type, the programming
methods and the logical methods (all the fields of our objects
are called methods, be they types, data or code).
Carrier type The carrier, or representation type, is the con-
crete representation of the elements of the set underlying the
structure defined by the species. The carrier is represented
by the keyword Self inside the species and outside, by the
name of the species itself, so that we identify the set with the
structure, as usual in mathematics. Each species must have
one unique carrier, but like all the other methods, it can be
either declared or defined. A declared carrier is simply an
abstract data type, while a defined one is a binding to a con-
crete type.
Programming methods These methods represent the con-
stants and the operators of the structure. Declared methods
are introduced by the keyword signature, defined meth-
ods are introduced by let and recursive definitions must
be explicitely flagged with the keyword rec. The language
used for the definitions is similar to the functional core
of OCaml [22] (let-binding, pattern matching, conditional,
higher order functions, etc), with the addition of a construc-
tion to call a method from a given structure. More precisely,
the main syntactic constructions of the language are the fol-
lowing:
• abstraction with respect to a variable: fun x -> ...
• application of a function: f(x)
• call of a method m from a structure c: c!m
• call of a method m of the structure we are currently build-
ing: Self!m or just m
Logical methods These methods represent the properties
of programming methods. In this context, the declaration of
a logical method is simply the statement of a property, while
the definition is a proof of this statement. In the first case,
we speak of properties (property) that are still to be proved
later in the development, while in the second case we speak
of theorems (theorem). The language also allows logical def-
initions (logical let) to bind names to logical statements.
The language used for the statements is composed of the
basic logical connectors and, or, ->, <->, not, and univer-
sal (all) and existential (ex) quantification over a FoCaLiZe
type. Proofs in FoCaLiZe are written in a declarative format
inspired by Lamport’s work [11, 21]. A proof is a tree where
the programmer introduces names (assume) and hypotheses
(hypothesis), gives a statement to prove (prove) and then
provides justification for the statement. This justification can
be: (1) a “conclude” clause for fully automatic proof; (2) a
“by” clause with a list of definitions, properties, hypothe-
ses, previous theorems, and previous steps (subject to some
scoping conditions) for use by the automatic prover; (3) a
sequence of proofs (with their own assumptions, statements,
and proofs) whose statements will be used by the automatic
prover to prove the current statement. Hence, each step of
a proof is independent of the others and can be reused in
a similar context (this eases the maintenance of proofs and
allows, for example, using exactly the same proof for a state-
ment based on an hypothesis A and for the same statement
Figure 1. FoCaLiZe
based on a stronger hypothesis B, provided the automatic
prover can make the inference from B to A).
2.2 Combining species
The main (object-oriented) features of FoCaLiZe are illus-
trated in Figure 1: a FoCaLiZe development is organized as
a hierarchy which may have several roots. The upper levels
of the hierarchy are built during the specification stage while
the lower ones correspond to implementations.
Inheritance Using inheritance in FoCaLiZe, one can en-
rich a species with additional operations (methods) and re-
define some methods of the parent species, but one can also
get closer to a runnable implementation by providing ex-
plicit definitions to methods that were only declared in the
parent. Note that the inheritance framework requires to per-
form static analysis in order to check coherence properties
(inheritance lookup, resolution of multiple-inheritance con-
flicts, dependency analysis, type-checking, etc). In FoCaL-
iZe, classical object-oriented features have been restricted
in order to avoid unsound constructions that can lead to in-
consistencies when used carelessly. A species can inherit the
declarations and definitions of one or several already defined
species and is free to define or redefine any inherited method
as long as such (re)definition does not change the type of the
method.
Collections A collection is built upon a completely defined
species. This means that every method must be defined. In
other words, in a collection, every operation has an imple-
mentation, and every theorem is formally proved. In addi-
tion, a collection is “frozen”: it cannot be used as a parent
of a species in the inheritance graph. Moreover, to ensure
modularity and abstraction, the carrier of a collection is hid-
den: seen from the outside, it becomes an abstract type. This
means that any software component dealing with a collec-
tion will only be able to manipulate it through the operations
it provides (i.e. its methods). This point is especially impor-
tant since it prevents other software components from break-
ing representation invariants required by the internals of the
collection.
Parameterization Besides inheritance, another important
feature of FoCaLiZe is the ability to parameterize a species
by collections parameters (whose “types” are given species.
This mechanism allows using a species, not to embed its
methods, but rather to use it as an “ingredient” to build a
new structure by calling its methods explicitly.
2.3 Programming with FoCaLiZe
The computational part of FoCaLiZe is validated by its com-
puter algebra library, mostly developed by R. Rioboo [6, 25]
which implements mathematical structures up to multivari-
ate polynomial rings and includes complex algorithms with
performance comparable to the best computer algebra sys-
tems in existence. Furthermore, as we will see, this library is
very useful when formalizing some security models based
on partial orders, lattices or boolean algebras. Of course,
nowadays, proof assistants provide some features for struc-
turing code (module systems, type classes, etc), but most
of them still cannot be used to obtain efficient programs.
Compilation of FoCaLiZe developments leads to efficient
OCaml programs (which are not obtained by extracting com-
putational contents of proofs). It is this focus on efficiency
that makes FoCaLiZe a real programming language. Hence,
the main originality of FoCaLiZe is to provide an object-
oriented programming language that allows mixing specifi-
cations, programs and proofs. To our knowledge, only the
Agda [8] programming language, based on dependent types
and compiling via Haskell, has a comparable mix of fea-
tures. Note that the FoCaLiZe language is also based on a de-
pendent type language, but with some restrictions on depen-
dencies: for instance, a function cannot depend on a proof.
By allowing such dependencies, we might get a better treat-
ment of partial functions, but function redefinition would get
trickier to handle because of logical clashes. In practice, this
seems too difficult and we have rejected this possibility.
3. Security policies and secured systems
Several points of view exist on security policies, among
which two main approaches can be distinguished: the rule-
based approach (which consists in specifying the conditions
under which an action is granted) and the property-based ap-
proach (which consists in specifying the security properties
the policy aims to enforce). These two approaches are for-
mally specified and compared in [19], and an operational
mechanism for enforcing such policies over transition sys-
tems is defined together with the proof of its soundness. In
this framework, one can characterize the various entities in-
volved in the definition of a security policy together with
their roles, thus providing a semantic specification of secu-
rity policies. Several developments on access control poli-
cies and flow policies have been done within this framework:
an operational mechanism that detects illegal information
flows according to the flow policy induced by an access con-
trol policy is defined in [20], and the rule-based approach is
considered in [7] by using rewrite systems. In this paper, we
focus on the property-based approach, which provides for a
clear distinction between a policy and its enforcement mech-
anism.
3.1 Security policies
Defining a security policy by following the property-based
approach consists in characterizing secure elements of a set
according to some security information. Thus, specifying a
policy P first consists in defining a set T of “things” that the
policy aims at controlling, called the security targets. These
“things” can be the actions simultaneously done in the sys-
tem, or some information about the entities of the system.
Then a set C of security configurations is introduced: con-
figurations correspond to the information needed to charac-
terize secure elements of T according to the policy. Finally,
the policy is specified by a binary relation  between targets
and configurations: c  t means that the target t is secure
according to the configuration c. Hence, a security policy is
a triple:
P = (T, C,)
where T is a set of security targets, C is a set of security
configurations and ⊆ C × T is a relation specifying secure
targets according to configurations.
For example, when dealing with access control policies,
targets are sets of accesses simultaneously done in the sys-
tem and we can represent accesses as triples (s, o, a) ex-
pressing that a subject s ∈ S has an access over an object
o ∈ O according to an access mode a ∈ A. Hence, in this
context, the set TA of targets is the powerset of the cartesian
product S×O×A. In this paper, we illustrate our develope-
ment with two classical access control policies.
The HRU policy [18] is a discretionary access control
policy whose configurations are sets of authorized accesses,
thus targets and configurations both specify sets of accesses
and we have TA = CHRU. Hence, secure targets are defined
as sets of accesses which are granted:
c PHRU t⇔ t ⊆ c
We also consider the mandatory part of the Bell & La-
Padula policy [4], whose configurations are tuples:
(L,, fo, fs) ∈ CBLP
where (L,) is a partially ordered set of security levels (or
sensitivities), and where fo : O → L (resp. fs : S →
L) associates a security level with each object (resp. each
subject). Then, secure targets are sets of accesses such that
the following two properties hold.
• (MAC property) Each read access over an object o is done
by a subject whose security level is greater than or equal
to fo(o) (in order to ensure a confidentiality policy).
∀(s, o, read) ∈ t, fo(o)  fs(s)
• (MAC? property) Each write access over an object o1 is
done by a subject whose read accesses are only done over
objects o2 such that fo(o2)  fo(o1) (in order to avoid
information flows from high levels to low levels):
∀(s, o1,write) ∈ t,∀(s, o2, read) ∈ t, fo(o2)  fo(o1)
3.2 Enforcement mechanism of security policies
Property-based policies can be used to ensure some security
properties over reachable states of labelled transition sys-
tems (LTSs). We now define such an enforcement mecha-
nism by showing how to “apply” a policy P = (T, C,)
“over” a LTS S = (Σ,Σ0, L, δ) (where Σ is the set of states,
Σ0 ⊆ Σ is the set of initial states, L is the set of labels (or ac-
tions) and δ ⊆ Σ×L×Σ is the transition relation). Features
of the system we want to obtain are described by S while
security requirements of this system are specified by P.
First, in order to define a secured system from S and P,
we have to define an interface between the system and the
policy. This can be done by considering an interpretation:
I : Σ→ T
mapping states of the system to targets of the policy. Then,
according to this interpretation, a secured system can be
defined by:
SP = (ΣP,Σ0P, L, δP)
where
• ΣP = Σ × C (configurations are used to monitor the
system and a state of the secured system corresponds to
a state of the initial system and a configuration of the
policy),
• Σ0P is the set of secure initial states:
Σ0P = {(σ, c) | σ ∈ Σ0 ∧ c  I(σ)}
• δP is the transition relation obtained from δ by removing




l−→δP (σ2, c) |
σ1
l−→δ σ2 ∧ c  I(σ1)⇒ c  I(σ2)
}
Of course, it is easy to prove (by induction) that every reach-
able state (σ, c) of SP is secure according to P (i.e. is such
that c  I(σ)). Hence, by following such an approach, the
initial system is designed to ensure some features (for exam-
ple, an access system allows opening and to closing accesses
over objects) without taking into account security, while the
policy is intended to specify the desired security properties,
which generally depend on external information about the
configurations (for example, a policy specifying secure sets
of opened accesses according to autorized accesses). There-
fore, the definition of SP provides a generic method to auto-
matically enforce an abstract security policy on a system.
4. Development of secured systems within
FoCaLiZe
This section describes the implementation within FoCaLiZe
of the framework presented in section 3. More precisely, we
show here how to take advantage of the features provided by
FoCaLiZe to easily produce a modular, certified and efficient
implementation of a secured system. As we said, none of
these features are new, but it is their combination within
the same programming language that is original. Throughout
this section, only the most significant parts of the code will
be shown (technical details will be replaced with “...”).
4.1 Transition systems
We first briefly describe the implementation of LTSs from
which secured systems will be defined. In Table 1, we intro-
duce the species Trans syst that describes a transition sys-
tem parameterized by a set S of states (species State con-
taining the declaration of a predicate characterizing initial
states), a set L of labels (species Label), and an abstract
notion SLS of triples (species Abstract triple providing
generic methods over triples). These species inherit from the
species Setoid (non-empty set with an equivalence relation).
species State =
inherit Setoid;
signature is_initial : Self -> bool;
end;;
species Label = inherit Setoid; end;;
The parameter SLS can be viewed as a simple data struc-
ture, provided to methods of the species Trans syst to ma-
nipulate triples. This is needed when defining sequences of
transitions of a LTS (which are lists of triples, each triple
(σ1, l, σ2) denoting a transition, labeled l, from state σ1 to
state σ2). Since a transition system can be completely de-
fined by the parameters and the methods introduced by the
species Trans syst, we use unit as its carrier type. Note that
this species describes a single transition system, not a collec-
tion of transition systems. The (declared) method delta cor-
responds to the transition relation of the system; it is used
to define the logical methods that specify determinism and
completeness of this transition transition relation. The logi-
cal method is reachable specifies the set of reachable states
of this transition system: a state x is reachable iff there ex-
ists a sequence of transitions starting from an initial state and
ending by x. This method is based on the recursive boolean
function is path from init to that characterizes sequences
of transitions starting from an initial state and leading to a
given state:
• is path from init to([],x)=true means that the empty
sequence of transition leads to the state x (i.e. x is an
initial state).
• is path from init to(h::`, x) = true means that h is
a triple (y, l, x) ∈ δ and ` is a sequence of transitions
starting from an initial state and leading to the state y.
These two properties are introduced as theorems (automat-
ically proved from the definition of is path from init to)
and are our specification of the is path from init to method.
Of course, introducing theorems corresponding to these
properties (which are very similar to the definition) may
seem redundant. However, if the is path from init to
method is redefined through inheritance, proofs of these
theorems will be erased by the FoCaLiZe compiler and
will have to be re-done with the new definition. There-
fore, these theorems can be used during the proofs of
other results, which avoids depending on the definition of
is path from init to and thus allows redefining it with-
out invalidating these proofs (only the proofs of the spec-
ification of is path from init to have to be done again).
Remark that the inheritance mechanisms of object-oriented
programming are not harmless when dealing with theorems:
the main point here is that the redefinition of a function dur-
ing inheritance may invalidate some proofs which are then
erased and must be redone in the new context. In [24], such
issues are discussed and a methodology is proposed to min-
imize the impact of redefinitions on proofs.
In practice, transition systems are often defined by a tran-
sition function τ : Σ × L → Σ. Hence, we also introduce
the species Op trans syst that inherits from Trans syst and
adds the declaration of a transition function from which the
declared method delta can now be defined:
(σ1, l, σ2) ∈ δ ⇔ τ(σ1, l) = σ2
The definition of Op trans syst also gives the properties
(deterministic and complete) that this definition leads to
a deterministic and complete transition relation, along with
the proofs of these properties.
Example: access system Based on the specification of
LTSs within FoCaLiZe, we now build an implementation of
access systems. An access system provides a way for users
of a system (the subjects in S) to access sets of services or
resources (the objects inO) according to some access modes
(in A). Subjects, objects and access modes are specified by
finite sets:
species Subject = inherit Finite_set; end;;
species Object = inherit Finite_set; end;;
species Access_mode = inherit Finite_set; end;;
and states are represented by finite parts of the cartesian
product S ×O×A. Hence, the species State ac is parame-
terized by the subjects, the objects and the access modes, but
also by the implementations of triples and finite subsets:
species Trans syst (S is State, L is Label, SLS is Abstract triple(S, L, S)) =
inherit Basic object;
representation = unit;
signature delta : S -> L -> S -> bool;
logical let is deterministic =
all x y z : S, all l : L, ( delta (x, l, y) /\ delta (x, l, z) ) -> S!equal (y, z);
logical let is complete = all x : S, all l : L, ex y : S, delta (x, l, y);
let rec is path from init to(p, x) = match p with
| [] -> S!is initial (x)
| h :: q -> S!equal (SLS!third(h), x) && delta (SLS!first(h), SLS!second(h), x)
&& is path from init to (q, SLS!first(h));;
theorem is path from init to base: all x: S, is path from init to([], x) <-> S!is initial(x)
proof = by definition of is path from init to;
theorem is path from init to ind: all x: S, all h: SLS, all q: list(SLS),
is path from init to((h :: q), x)
<-> S!equal (SLS!third(h), x) /\ delta (SLS!first(h), SLS!second(h), x)
/\ is path from init to (q, SLS!first(h))
proof = by definition of is path from init to;
logical let is reachable (x) = ex p : list (SLS), is path from init to (p, x);
... end;;
species Op trans syst (S is State, L is Label, SLS is Abstract triple(S, L, S)) =
inherit Trans syst (S, L, SLS);
signature transition : S -> L -> S;
let delta(s1, l, s2) = S!equal(transition(s1, l), s2);
theorem deterministic : is deterministic proof = ...
theorem complete : is complete proof = ...
... end;;
Table 1. Transition systems
species State_ac(
S is Subject, O is Object, A is Access_mode,
SOA is Abstract_triple(S, O, A),
PSOA is Finite_parts(SOA)) ...
This species inherits from the species State, defines one ini-
tial state (the empty set) and specifies the carrier type as the
representation of finite subsets of the set of triples (obtained
from the parameter PSOA). Labels of access systems are just
pairs 〈+, (s, o, a)〉 and 〈−, (s, o, a)〉 expressing that a sub-
ject s is going to to access (+) or to release its access (−) to
the object o according to the mode a. This is specified by the
species:
species Label_ac(
S is Subject, O is Object, A is Access_mode,
SOA is Abstract_triple(S, O, A)) ...




A ∪ {(s, o, a)} if l = 〈+, (s, o, a)〉
A \ {(s, o, a)} if l = 〈−, (s, o, a)〉
obtained by using operations over finite subsets, it becomes
possible to define a species:
species Op_trans_syst_ac(
S is Subject,O is Object, A is Access_mode,
SOA is Abstract_triple(S, O, A),
L is Label_ac(S, O, A, SOA),
PSOA is Finite_parts(SOA),
St is State_ac(S, O, A, SOA, PSOA),
SLS is Abstract_triple(St, L, St)) ...
that inherits from Op trans syst(St, L, SLS) and imple-
ments a complete and deterministic access system.
4.2 Secured systems
4.2.1 Secure states and Secured systems
Formalizing the framework introduced in section 3 within
FoCaLiZe has led us to generalize it in order to obtain a
generic and modular implementation. Indeed, the definition
of a secured system is strongly related to the notion of se-
cure state. We reuse here the notations of section 3, where
the notion of secure state is defined by considering security
policies and the states of a secured system are defined as the
product Σ × C (where C corresponds to the set of config-
urations of the policy), thus only secured systems obtained
from a system and a policy can be described by following
this approach. However, the construction of a secured system
is independent of the way secure states are defined. Hence,
we introduce here a more abstract notion of secure state that
specifies what are states of secured systems (this abstract no-
tion will be instantiated by Σ×C when considering policies).
This allows using our development with other approaches
that define a notion of secure state.
From an abstract point of view, the set Σ′ of states of
a secured system is obtained from the set Σ of states of the
system we want to make secure and a predicate Ω over Σ that
characterizes which stats are secure. In fact, the set Σ′ can be
viewed as a structure over Σ. Hence, we define the species
Sec state deriving Σ′ from the parameter Σ. This species
contains the declaration of the method state that maps back
to the state σ ∈ Σ from which a state σ′ ∈ Σ′ was obtained:
state corresponds to a projection function IS : Σ′ → Σ.
The converse method make is also declared to characterize
the “decoration” that was added to a state σ ∈ Σ to obtain
a state σ′ ∈ Σ′: if σ′ ∈ Σ′ has been obtained from σ0 ∈ Σ,
then make(σ′, σ) = σ′′ means that the “decoration” which
has been added when transforming σ0 into σ′ is the same as
the one used to transform σ into σ′′. Finally, we declare the
method is secure (corresponding to our Ω predicate) that
characterizes the secure states of Σ′. It allows us to define
the initial states of Σ′ (method is initial inherited from
the species State) as the set:{
σ′ ∈ Σ′ | IS(σ′) ∈ Σ0 ∧ Ω(σ′)
}
Therefore, σ′ is initial iff it is secure according to Ω and it
has been obtained from an initial state σ ∈ Σ0.
species Sec_state (S is State) =
inherit State;
signature state : Self -> S;
signature make : Self -> S -> Self;
signature is_secure : Self -> bool;
property make_spec : all x: Self,
equal(make(x, state(x)), x);
let is_initial (x : Self) =
S!is_initial (state (x)) && is_secure (x);
... end;;
From this abstract notion of secure state, it becomes possible
to implement secured systems (see table 2). First the species
Sec trans syst is defined: it is parameterized by a transition
system Sys (obtained from a set St of states and a set L
of labels) and a notion of secure states Ss (obtained from
St), and specifies (by inheritance) a transition system whose
states are in Ss and whose labels are in L. The transition
relation δΩ of this system is defined from the transition






l−→δ IS(σ2) ∧ Ω(σ1)⇒ Ω(σ2)
}
This definition allows us to prove the theorem asserting that
each reachable state of this system is secure: the proof of
the theorem reachable is secure is obtained by telling the
Zenon automatic theorem prover to use the definition of
reachable states (based on the method is path from init to),
and the theorem all secure (which asserts that if ` is a list
representing a sequence of transitions that starts with an ini-
tial state and ends with a state x, then x is secure). As we
can see in table 2, the proof of all secure is obtained by
induction over `:
• <1>1 is the proof of the base case obtained when ` is
the empty list [] by telling Zenon to use the theorem
is path from init to base (which is part of the spec-
ification of is path from init to and entails that x is
an initial state), and the property Ss!is initial spec,
proved in the species Sec state, which specifies that ini-
tial states are secure (here again, the proof does not de-
pend on the definition of is initial but only on its spec-
ification).
• <1>2 is the proof of the inductive step obtained when `
is non-empty by telling Zenon to use the definition of δΩ
(the method delta of the species Sec trans syst), the
theorem is path from init to ind (which is part of the
specifcation of the method is path from init to, as de-
scribed on page 5), the specification of projection opera-
tors and equality over triples, the reflexivity property of
equality over labels, and a property on the equality de-
fined over states (expressing that this relation is a con-
gruence for the transition relation).
As we can see, proving a property within FoCaLiZe can usu-
ally be done just by identifying the definitions that must be
unfolded and the properties from which Zenon can automat-
ically build the proof.
Intuitively, δΩ is obtained by removing from δ all the
“non-secure” transitions. Hence, even if δ is complete, δΩ
is not necessarily complete and we have to refine this defi-
nition in order to obtain a complete and deterministic tran-
sition system. This can be done by replacing “non-secure”
transitions from a state σ with the “identity” transition from
σ (other approaches can be defined: for example, in some
cases, it may be useful to introduce an element ⊥ denoting
an error state obtained when trying to perform a forbidden
action in a system). Thus, we define the transition function
τΩ : Σ
′×L→ Σ′ from the transition function τ : Σ×L→ Σ
(of the initial system) as follows:
τΩ(σ1, l) =
 make(σ1, τ(IS(σ1), l))if Ω(σ1)⇒ Ω(make(σ1, τ(IS(σ1), l)))
σ1 otherwise
By following such an approach, we define the species
Sec op trans syst, which implements a complete and de-
terministic transition system parameterized by the complete
and deterministic system Sys that we want to make secure,
and a notion Ss of secure states, and which implements (by
inheritance) both a secured system and a deterministic and
complete system. However, since the transition relation of
the complete and deterministic system is defined from τΩ,










l−→δ′Ω σ1 |6 ∃σ2 σ1
l−→δΩ σ2
}
which does not coincide with the definition of δΩ. In fact,
the method delta of the species Sec trans syst is redefined
here. Therefore, the proof of all secure (which depends
on the definition of the transition relation) from the species
Sec trans syst is erased by FoCaLiZe, and we have to give
another proof to take the new definition into account.
4.2.2 Secured systems and Policies
We show here how to instantiate our generic notion of se-
cured system by considering security policies as introduced
in section 3.
Security policies We first introduce the species imple-
menting a policy, parameterized by a setoid of targets and
a setoid of configurations. It inherits from the species of bi-
nary relations. We declare the method secure to characterize
secure targets according to configurations. It is used to de-
fine the relation method inherited from the binary relation
species.
species Target = inherit Setoid; end;;
species Configuration = inherit Setoid; end;;
species P_policy
(A is Target, C is Configuration)=
inherit Relation (A, C);
signature secure: A -> C -> bool;
let relation(a, c) = secure(a, c);
end;;
Example: Access control policies As illustrated by fig-
ure 2, the species P policy is the root of a hierarchy of
security policies. For example, the species P policy ac im-
plements access control policies and can be defined by sim-
ply specifying targets as an abstract ternary relation between
subjects, objects and access modes:
species P_policy_ac (
S is Subject, O is Object,A is Access_mode,
R is Ternary_relations(S, O, A),
T is Target_ac(S, O, A, R),
C is Configuration)=
inherit P_policy (T, C);
end;;
Hence, at this level, nothing is assumed on the representation
of sets of accesses and this species can be instantiated with
any implementation of sets of accesses that inherits from
Ternary relations(S, O, A). Then, the HRU policy (intro-
duced in section 3) can be specified as follows:
species P_policy_hru (
S is Subject, O is Object, A is Access_mode,
R is Ternary_relations(S, O, A),
T is Target_ac (S, O, A, R),
C is Configuration_ac (S, O, A, R)) =
inherit P_policy_ac (S, O, A, R, T, C);
let secure (t, c) =
R!is_contained(T!as_relation(t),C!as_relation(c));
... end;;
Configurations of this policy are also sets of (authorized) ac-
cesses represented by the same abstract notion of ternary
relation than targets (specified by the parameter R), and
from which the method secure can be defined: t is se-
cure according to c iff t, viewed as a relation, is con-
tained in c, also viewed as a relation (species Target ac and
Configuration ac both contain the method as relation:Self
-> R).
We can also refine the definition of P policy ac by con-








S is Subject, O is Object, A is Access_mode_rw,
R is Ternary_relations(S,O,A),
T is Target_ac (S, O, A, R),
C is Configuration)=
inherit P_policy_ac (S, O, A, R, T, C);
end;;
Now, we can refine again the definition of the HRU policy
by using multiple inheritance as follows:
species P_policy_hru_rw(
S is Subject,O is Object, A is Access_mode_rw,
R is Ternary_relations(S,O,A),
T is Target_ac (S, O, A, R),
C is Configuration_ac (S, O, A, R)) =
inherit P_policy_ac_rw(S, O, A, R, T, C),
P_policy_hru(S, O, A, R, T, C);
end;;
As we can see here, parameterization and inheritance are
powerful mechanisms for building new components from
existing components.
The species P policy ac rw can also be refined by con-
sidering the Bell & LaPadula policy (introduced in sec-
tion 3). Security levels are obtained by inheritance from the
species Partial order of the FoCaLiZe library, and are used
to define the species of configurations:
species Security_level=inherit Partial_order; end;;
species Configuration_BLP
(S is Subject, O is Object, L is Security_level)=
inherit Configuration;
signature fs: Self -> S -> L;
signature fo: Self -> O -> L;
end;;
The Bell & LaPadula policy can now be implemented:
species Sec trans syst (St is State, L is Label, SLT is Abstract triple(St, L, St),
Sys is Trans syst (St, L, SLT), Ss is Sec state (St), SLS is Abstract triple(Ss, L, Ss)) =
inherit Trans syst (Ss, L, SLS);
let delta (x : Ss, l : L, y : Ss) =
Sys!delta (Ss!state (x), l, Ss!state (y)) && ( ~~ Ss!is secure (x) || Ss!is secure (y) );
theorem all secure: all l: list(SLS), all x: Ss, is path from init to(l, x) -> Ss!is secure (x)
proof =
<1>1 prove all x: Ss, is path from init to([], x) -> Ss!is secure (x)
by property is path from init to base, Ss!is initial spec
<1>2 prove all l: list(SLS),
(all z: Ss, is path from init to(l, z) -> Ss!is secure(z))
-> all x: Ss, all t: SLS, is path from init to((t :: l), x) -> Ss!is secure(x)
by definition of delta
property is path from init to ind, L!equal reflexive, SLS!is first, SLS!is second,
SLS!is third, SLS!equal spec, delta equal compat
<1>3 conclude ;
theorem reachable is secure: all x: Ss, is reachable(x) -> Ss!is secure(x)
proof = by definition of is reachable property all secure;
... end;;
species Sec op trans syst(St is State, L is Label, SLT is Abstract triple(St, L, St),
Sys is Op trans syst(St, L, SLT), Ss is Sec state (St), SLS is Abstract triple(Ss, L, Ss) ) =
inherit Sec trans syst (St, L, SLT, Sys, Ss, SLS), Op trans syst (Ss, L, SLS);
let transition(x, l) = let s = Sys!transition(Ss!state(x), l) in let y = Ss!make(x, s) in
if ((~~ Ss!is secure(x)) || Ss!is secure(y)) then y else x;
proof of all secure = ...
... end;;
Table 2. Secured systems
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Figure 2. Hierarchy of development of security policies
species P_policy_BLP(
S is Subject, O is Object,
L is Security_level, A is Access_mode_rw,




C is Configuration_BLP(S, O, L)) =
inherit P_policy_ac_rw(S, O, A, R, T, C);
representation = unit ;
logical let mac(c, r) = all s: S, all o: O,
(R!relation(r, s, o, A!read)
-> L!leq(C!fo(c, o), C!fs(c, s));
logical let mac_star(c, r) = ...
logical let is_secure(t, c) =
mac(c, T!as_relation(t))
/\ mac_star(c, T!as_relation(t));
let rec mac_secure(l, c) = match l with
| [] -> true
| h::t ->








let rec mac_star_secure(l, c) = ...
theorem mac_star_correct: ...
let secure(t,c)=
let l = PSOA!to_list(T!as_part(t))
in mac_secure(l, c) && mac_star_secure(l, c)
theorem secure_is_correct: all t: T, all c: C,
secure(t, c) <-> is_secure(t, c)
proof = ...
end;;
Note that while the HRU policy can be specified with a very
abstract notion of set of accesses (only an inclusion test is
needed), the BLP policy needs a more concrete specifica-
tion of sets of accesses because we have to be able to con-
sider each access and to use projection functions to spec-
ify properties on subjects, objects and access modes occur-
ring in accesses. This is obtained by taking as parameters
ternary relations represented as finite sets of triples (species
Relations by sets of triples). This makes a difference
when comparing policies “on paper” and implementations of
these policies within FoCaLiZe. The species P policy BLP
defines two predicates (mac and mac star) that correspond
exactly to the properties introduced in section 3; they char-
acterize secure targets according to configurations: they are
expressed by considering targets as ternary relations. How-
ever, the method secure declared in the species P policy
(from which P policy BLP inherits) is a boolean function
and needs an operational definition. Hence, we define the
methods mac secure and mac star secure which are func-
tions, where targets are considered as finite sets represented
by lists. Of course, we prove the equivalence between each
predicate and its corresponding function.
Secure states and security policies We show here how to
refine the species of states of a secured system by consider-
ing a security policy. As we said in section 3, states of the
secured system are pairs belonging to the cartesian product
ΣP = Σ × C and we introduce the species Sec state pol
(specifying a set Σ′ of states) parameterized by a policy P
and the set of states Σ of the system we want to make se-
cure. It inherits from the species of cartesian products (in-
stantiated with Σ and C and from the species Sec state(Σ).
In this context the method state can be defined by the func-
tion IS : ΣP → Σ such that:
∀(σ, c) ∈ ΣP, IS((σ, c)) = σ
Conversely, the method make is defined by:
make((σ1, c), σ2) = (σ2, c)
Finally, secure states of Σ′ are characterized by introducing
an interpretation I : Σ → T as explained in section 3. This
leads us to define the predicate Ω by:
Ω((σ, c))⇔ c  I(σ)
species Sec_state_pol(
A is Target, C is Configuration,
P is P_policy (A, C),
S is State) =
inherit Cartesian_product(S, C), Sec_state(S);
let state(s) = first(s);
let configuration(s) = second(s);
let make(s_s, s_i) = pair(s_i, configuration(s_s));
proof of make_spec = ...
signature interpretation : S -> A;




Enforcement mechanism of security policies We are now
ready to implement secured systems by considering policies.
Here again, thanks to the parameterization and inheritance
mechanisms, this can be done just by combining already
defined species. Indeed, the species implementing a secured
system that corresponds to the system SP defined in section 3
can directly be obtained by considering secure states built




P is P_policy(A, C),
St is State,
L is Label,
SLS is Abstract_triple(St, L, St),
Sys is Trans_syst(St, L, SLS),
Ss is Sec_state_pol(A, C, P, St),
SsLS is Abstract_triple(Ss, L, Ss)) =
inherit Sec_trans_syst(St, L, SLS, Sys, Ss, SsLS);
end;;
Similarly, the deterministic and complete system secured by




P is P_policy(A, C),
St is State,
L is Label,
SLS is Abstract_triple(St, L, St),
Sys is Op_trans_syst(St, L, SLS),
Ss is Sec_state_pol(A, C, P, St),





Hence, the transition relation of such a system is defined by:
δ′P ={
(σ1, c)
l−→δ′P (σ2, c) |
σ1





l−→δ′P (σ1, c) |
σ1
l−→δ σ2 ∧ c  I(σ1) ∧ ¬c  I(σ2)
}
and, as we said, does not exactly correspond to δP.
Example: Secured access system We can now obtain a se-
cured access system from the species introduced above. For
example, we can build the following deterministic and com-
plete system from the species Op trans syst ac (specifying
what is an access system) and P policy BLP (specifying the






SOA is Triples_by_pairs(S, O, A),
PSOA is Finite_parts(SOA),
St is State_ac(S, O, A, SOA, PSOA),
La is Label_ac(S, O, A, SOA),
SLS is Abstract_triple(St, La, St),
R is Relations_by_sets_of_triples(S,O,A,SOA,PSOA),
T is Target_ac_by_sets_of_triples(S,O,A,SOA,PSOA,R),
C is Configuration_BLP(S, O, Le),
P is P_policy_BLP(S, O, Le, A, SOA, PSOA, R, T, C),
Sys is Op_trans_syst_ac(S,O,A,SOA,La,PSOA,St,SLS),
Ss is Sec_state_pol(T, C, P, St),
SsLS is Abstract_triple(Ss, La, Ss)) =
inherit Sec_op_trans_syst_pol
(T, C, P, St, La, SLS, Sys, Ss, SsLS);
end;;
Here again, parameters both specify the “ingredients” needed
to define the species and the way these “ingredients” are
combined at several levels of abstraction (for example,
triples built from subjects, objects and access modes are here
represented by pairs of the form (s, (o, a)) which is a very
concrete representation, while triples built from states, labels
and states are just specified at a higher level of abstraction.
5. Conclusion
Many developments have been done on security policies and
enforcement mechanisms but few of them are formalized
within a generic framework that allows reusing, compar-
ing and composing such developments. Furthermore, oper-
ational mechanims used to enforce policies are usually not
designed independently of the policy they are intended to
enforce, which does not lead to a clear separation between
the specification of the desired security properties and the
mechanisms (i.e. the method used to implement the policy)
that enforce these properties. In [26], by using the B refine-
ment process [1], an enforcement mechanism of a policy in
a TCP/IP network is obtained from an abstract specification
of this policy. Our approach is similar: in this paper, we have
both introduced an abstract framework for specifying secu-
rity policies and a sound generic operational mechanism to
enforce such policies over transition systems.
In order to formally certify our enforcement mechanism,
our implementation is done within the FoCaLiZe program-
ming environment, and yields modular programs. Indeed,
thanks to its object-oriented features, FoCaLiZe allows us to
describe the same notion at several levels of abstraction (at
each level, we focus on the main operations we want to spec-
ify or to define). Moreover, many software components im-
plemented within FoCaLiZe (i.e. species or collections) can
be directly built by inheritance and parameterization from
already defined components. Hence, such developments can
easily be reused in different contexts. Last but not least, it
should be noted that the proofs were easy to do, thanks to
the Zenon automatic theorem prover.
Of course, all these features facilitate the development
of certified programs and therefore FoCaLiZe is particularly
well-suited to develop libraries for secure applications. In
fact, the claim behind FoCaLiZe is that formal developments
increase confidence in the final code. One of the main char-
acteristics of critical software is that it is subject to the ap-
proval of a safety/security authority before its commission-
ing. These authorities have defined requirements explaining
what should be an acceptable software and its related life cy-
cle process for their own domain. For this reason, getting a
high confidence in produced code, and making it possible for
the safety/security authority to acquire this confidence is an
important task, for which FoCaLiZe brings solutions. Very
important is the possibility in FoCaLiZe to have specifica-
tion, implementation and proofs within the same language,
since it eliminates the errors introduced between layers, at
each switch between languages, during the development cy-
cle. Other frameworks like Atelier B [1] also aims to imple-
ment tools for making formal development a reality. FoCaL-
iZe doesn’t follow the same path, trying to keep the means of
expression close to what engineers usually know: a program-
ming language. Moreover, instead of having its own system
for proofs validation, FoCaLiZe makes use of external tools,
leaving the task of handling proof automation and verifica-
tion outside its scope and reaping the benefits of research
performed by others in these specific domains.
As future work, we plan to implement some comparison
mechanisms between security policies in order to formal-
ize within FoCaLiZe the flow-based interpretation of access
control policies, as defined in [20]. Indeed, we are currently
formalizing software requirements expressed in the standard
FIPS 140-3, which specifies security requirements of a cryp-
tographic module. This leads us to structure these require-
ments and to express them as security policies. Our aim is
to formally prove some abstract confinement, confidentiality
and integrity properties induced by these concrete require-
ments.
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